








IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT, DIVISION SIX
____________________
WILLIAM BOOKOUT, individually
and dba OCEANO NURSERY,
Plaintiffs/Appellants,
vs.
STATE OF CALIFORNIA -
DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION; COUNTY
OF SAN LUIS OBISPO; OCEANO
COMMUNITY SERVICES
DISTRICT; and
UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD,
Defendants/Respondents
))))))))))))))))
Second Appellate No. BB214906
Appeal from the Judgment of the
Superior Court of San Luis Obispo
County Case No. CV 060384
Hon. Martin J. Tangeman, Presiding
Phase One - Inverse Condemnation
Liability
Hon. Teresa Estrada-Mullaney, Presiding
Phase Two
____________________
APPELLANT’S REPLY BRIEF
____________________
John W. Belsher, #103088
Gregory A. Connell, # 233228
BELSHER & BECKER
412 Marsh Street
San Luis Obispo, CA 93401
(805) 542-9900
slolaw@belsherandbecker.com
Attorneys for Plaintiff and Appellant
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT, DIVISION SIX
____________________
WILLIAM BOOKOUT, individually
and dba OCEANO NURSERY,
Plaintiffs/Appellants,
vs.
STATE OF CALIFORNIA -
DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION; COUNTY
OF SAN LUIS OBISPO; OCEANO
COMMUNITY SERVICES
DISTRICT; and
UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD,
Defendants/Respondents
))))))))))))))))
Second Appellate No. BB214906
Appeal from the Judgment of the
Superior Court of San Luis Obispo
County Case No. CV 060384
Hon. Martin J. Tangeman, Presiding
Phase One - Inverse Condemnation
Liability
Hon. Teresa Estrada-Mullaney, Presiding
Phase Two
____________________
APPELLANT’S REPLY BRIEF
____________________
John W. Belsher, #103088
Gregory A. Connell, # 233228
BELSHER & BECKER
412 Marsh Street
San Luis Obispo, California 93401
Telephone: (805) 542-9900
slolaw@belsherandbecker.com
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant
i
TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE
I. INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
II. LEGAL DISCUSSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
A. A Three-Year Statute of Limitation is not a Complete Defense to this Action. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
B. Conditions in the Watershed are not Static which Entitles Appellant to a Delayed Accrual Date . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 C. The Flooding of Appellant’s Property is a Continuous Nuisance . . . . . . . . 1 D. Respondent’s Subversion of the Civil Discovery Act has Prejudiced Appellant’s Case . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 E. Appellant did not Ignore any Contrary Evidence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
III. CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
CERTIFICATE OF WORD COUNT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
PROOF OF SERVICE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
ii TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases Page
Akins v State
(1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Arreola v. County of Monterey
(2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 722. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3, 4
Belair v. Riverside County Flood Control District
(1988) 47 Cal.3d 550 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Lee v. Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority
(2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 848 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Lyles v. State of California
(2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 281 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Pacific Bell v. City of San Diego
(2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 596 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3, 4
Skoumbas v City of Orinda
(2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 783 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Statutes
Code of Civil Procedure § 338(j) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1
I.
INTRODUCTION
Appellant presents this reply to Respondents Oceano Community Services District,
County of San Luis Obispo, Union Pacific Railroad, and State of California - Department of
Transportation’s Brief.
II.
LEGAL DISCUSSION
A. A Three-Year Statute of Limitation is not a Complete Defense to this Action.
Respondents argue that the three-year statute of limitation found in Code of Civil
Procedure 338(j) is a complete defense to this action. Appellant has argued in it opening
brief that a five-year statute of limitation for a permanent continuing taking should apply
since these Defendants have created a drainage basin on Appellant’s property during any
substantial rainstorm. See Appellant’s opening brief, pgs 8-10.
Assuming, arguendo, that Appellant is held subject to a three-year statute of
limitation, the conditions at the Subject Property warrant successive three-year time periods
after each flood, since the conditions change every year and his property and inventory were
damaged differently during each flood. A continuous and repeated course of conduct causing
damages to one’s property which have not stabilized does not begin the accrual of a cause
of action. Lee v Los Angels County Metropolitan Transportation Authority (2003) 107
Cal.App.4th 848, 858. It is not argued that the culvert was still under construction when
2
Appellant’s property first began flooding, but that these Defendants continued to assert
control, use, perform haphazard maintenance, and alter the conditions of the watershed every
year which destabilizes the conditions at the drainage facility and causes the floods.
Respondents and the trial court cite to Lyles v State of California (2007) 153
Cal.App.4th 281, in support of their position that a three-year statute of limitation completely
bars Appellant’s action. Lyles v. State of California dealt with a one-time flood allegedly
caused by an inadequate drainage system surrounding Highway 1. This case did not address
how to apply the three-year statute of limitation when there are successive, periodic floods
every year. In Appellant’s situation, each flood creates a new statute of limitation since the
type of haphazard maintenance, severity of rain storm, upstream watershed conditions,
OCSD Well #8 operations, and the level of inlet storage capacity are different but existing
upon each flood.
B. Conditions in the Watershed are not Static which Entitles Appellant to a Delayed
Accrual Date
There have been several actions and modifications by Respondents to the drainage
chanel and watershed which are a cause of the flooding of Appellant’s property. Judge
Tangeman held that date of stabilization approach does not apply since the last improvements
to the drainage system were completed in the late 1970's and the flooding was consistent and
static for several years prior to the date the Plaintiff purchased his property (Appendix #13).
Below is a summary of the actions by Respondents which have changed the drainage
3
conditions relative to Appellant’s property since the construction of the junction box in the
late 1970's:
i) Maintenance activities in the drainage chanel. (Respondent’s Appendix
“RA” Exhibit 1768; Reporters Transcript “RT” Vol. 2 Pg 382-400; RT
Vol 6 Pg 1506-1507; Exhibit 1446-1447).
ii) Modification of Well #8 discharge pipe by OCSD. (RA Exhibit 1768)
iii) Operation of Well # 8 (RT Vol 2 Pg. 383)
iv) Weed abatement in the drainage chanel by OCSD. (RA Exhibit 1768;
RT Vol 6 Pg 1545)
v) Removal of retaining wall by Caltrans (RT Vol 3 Pg 642-643).
vi) Alteration of Highway One in the year 2002/2003 by Caltrans. (RT Vol
3 Pg 645-646)
vii) Alteration of Highway One in the year 2005/2006 by Caltrans (RT Vol
3 Pg 645)
viii) Constant shoveling and grading of debris into drainage chanel by
Caltrans. (RT Vol 4 Pgs 916-917, 920; Exhibits 1466-1467, 1513-1519)
ix) Accumulation of sedimentary debris in drainage chanel which reduces
storage capacity. (RT Vol. 4 Pg 920; RT Vol 6 Pg 1534; RT Vol. 6 Pgs.
1546-1551)
x) Increase in impervious surfaces in the watershed (RT Vol.6 Pgs 1572).
4
These activities have slowly destabilized any static condition in the watershed which
may have existed after the junction box modification in the late 1970's. Although there has
been conflicting evidence of when Appellant’s property first began flooding, these changes
in the watershed afford Appellant a delayed accrual date until the conditions remain
unchanged, which to date has not happened. If conditions have been static since the late
1970's as held by Judge Tangeman, why did it take 30 years for Plaintiff’s property to begin
flooding?
C. The Flooding of Appellant’s Property is a Continuous Nuisance
One of the factors to determine if a nuisance is permanent or continuous is the ability
to remedy the situation. Baker v. Burbank-Glendale-Pasadena Airport (1985) 29 Cal.3d 862,
869. As Appellant’s expert testified, the construction of a detention basin near the inlet of
the culvert would prevent Highway One and Appellant’s property from flooding. (RT Vol.
6 Pgs.1583-1584). Also, Respondent County of San Luis Obispo and the State of California
Department of Transportation designed a fix to the situation in 1987 for $43,295. (RA
Exhibit 1790). The situation in this case is not a permanent nuisance, and Judge Estrada-
Mullaney’s ruling preventing Appellant to proceed on his nuisance and trespass causes of
action in the second phase were in error. Under this rationale, if the Respondents put a lid
on the culvert today to prevent all drainage from entering it, Appellant would still not have
a cause of action for nuisance, even though this new act creates more flooding and more
damage.
5
D. Respondent’s Subversion of the Civil Discovery Act has Prejudiced Appellant’s
Case
Respondents have argued that the admittance of Exhibit 579 was not prejudicial and
was proper. The Civil Discovery Act requires all parties to make reasonable attempts to
respond to discovery in a timely manner and reasonable and diligent attempt to locate
requested documents. Exhibit 579 was never produced during discovery, and should have
been withheld from the trial after Appellant’s proper objection. Although admittedly
authored by Appellant, he did not remember completing the questionnaire and its use during
trial was a complete surprise to Appellant. (RT Vol.5 Pgs. 1219-1221). This error goes
beyond the mere non-disclosure of one document, all the responses to the questionnaires
presented to the Respondent County of San Luis Obispo from the public were withheld from
production. (Appendix # 14, 15). These additional withheld questionnaires from other
residents in the community contain possible new facts and new witness which could have
substantiated Appellant’s assertions regarding the date of accrual and the conflicting
testimony regarding the beginning of the flooding of his property. The admittance of Exhibit
579, and the discovery of additional facts and possible new witnesses substantiate the
prejudicial error and the necessity of a new trial.
E. Appellant did not Ignore any Contrary Evidence
Both Respondent County of San Luis Obispo and State of California - Department of
Transportation argue that Appellant has waived any argument concerning the sufficiency of
6
the evidence by failing to acknowledge both favorable and unfavorable evidence in its
Appendix. Appellant disagrees with this assertion, and submits it carefully considered all the
evidence presented at trial, and introduced in the appendix and brief only that evidence which
relates to the issues on appeal. While great care must be taken to furnish an adequate record
on appeal, it is also important to avoid including unnecessary material in the record. If any
party has required the inclusion of “any matter not reasonably material to the appeal's determination,” the appellate court can sanction the offending attorney and/or party by
withholding or assessing costs or imposing any other penalties deemed appropriate under the circumstances. CRC 8.276(a)(2); Garcia v. Lucindo (1961) 191 Cal.App.2d 303, 308. Balancing these duties, Appellant is not sure which evidence it did not included in its Appendix which he should have reasonably anticipated would be relied upon by Respondents. In any event, Respondents properly submitted their supplemental appendix with additional reference to Exhibits entered at trial. /// /// /// /// /// /// /// 7
III.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons and those contained in Appellant’s Opening Brief,
Appellant respectfully requests that this Court reverse Judge Tangeman’s ruling for Judgment
on the First Phase of the trial for Inverse Condemnation Liability, reverse Judge Estrada-
Mullaney’s ruling for Judgment on the Pleadings for the Second Phase of the trial, and order
a re-trial of this case on the issues presented therein.
Dated: January 26, 2010 BELSHER & BECKER
By: ______________________
Gregory A. Connell
Attorneys for Appellant WILLIAM
BOOKOUT dba OCEANO
NURSERY
8
CERTIFICATE OF WORD COUNT
(Cal. Rules of Court, rule 14(c)(1))
The text of this brief consists of ____ words as counted by the Corel WordPerfect
version X3 word-processing program used to generate the brief.
Dated: January 26, 2010 BELSHER & BECKER
By: ______________________
Gregory A. Connell
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant
WILLIAM BOOKOUT dba
OCEANO NURSERY
9
PROOF OF SERVICE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA )
) ss.
COUNTY OF SAN LUIS OBISPO )
I, ANGELA M. BREZDEN, declare as follows:
I am a citizen of the United States and an employee in the County of San Luis Obispo.
On the date set forth below, I caused the document(s) described below to be served:
APPELLANT’S REPLY BRIEF
on the interested parties in this action addressed as follows:
SEE ATTACHED SERVICE LIST
[X ] BY UNITED STATES MAIL: I am readily familiar with the firm’s practice of
collection and processing documents for mailing. Under that practice, the envelopes are sealed and, with postage thereon fully prepaid, deposited with the United States Postal Service on that same day at San Luis Obispo, California, in the ordinary course of business. I am aware that, on motion of the party served, service is presumed invalid if the postal cancellation date or postage meter date is more than one day after the date of deposit for mailing in this affidavit. [ ] BY HAND DELIVERY: I personally delivered such envelope to the offices of the
addressee, following ordinary business practices. [ ] BY FACSIMILE: I caused the above-described document(s) to be sent via facsimile
transmission to the offices of the addressee, following ordinary business practices. [ ] BY OVERNIGHT COURIER: I caused such document(s) to be delivered by
overnight mail to the offices of the addressee by placing it for collection by Federal Express following ordinary business practices, to wit, that package(s) will either be picked up from the firm by the courier service, and/or delivered to the courier’s office. [ ] BY E-MAIL: On the above-date at _____a.m., I electronically served the
above-described document(s) to the offices of the above. I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct. 10 Executed and served on January __, 2010 at San Luis Obispo, California. _______________________________ ANGELA M. BREZDEN 11
BOOKOUT et al. v. OCEANO COMMUNITY SERVICES DISTRICT
APPEAL CASE NO. B214906
PARTY LIST
Adam Daner, Esq. (SBN 171886)
Daner Law Firm
5855 Capistrano Ave., Suite G
Atascadero, CA 93422
Tel: 805-464-5003
Fax: 805-464-5004
Email: unlisted
Attorney for Respondent OCEANO
COMMUNITY SERVICES DISTRICT
Thomas A. Cregger, Esq. (SBN 124402)
Randolph, Cregger & Chalfant, LLP
1030 G. Street
Sacramento, CA 95814
Tel: 916-443-4443
Fax: 916-443-2124
Email: tac@randolphlaw.net
Attorney for Respondent UNION
PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY
Derek VanHoften, Esq. (SBN 226880)
David Sullivan, Esq. (SBN 142881)
P.O. Box 7444
San Francisco, CA 94120-7444
Tel: 415-904-5700
Fax: 415-904-2333
Attorney for Respondent STATE OF
CALIFORNIA DEPT. OF
TRANSPORTATION
Terence J. Cassidy
PORTER SCOTT
350 University Ave., Suite 200
Sacramento, CA 95825
Tel: 916-929-1481
Fax: 916-927-3706
Attorney for COUNTY OF SAN LUIS
OBISPO
California Attorney General
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
P.O. Box 94425
Sacramento, CA 94244-2550
Supreme Court of California
303 Second Street
South Tower, Eighth Floor
San Francisco, California 94107
4 copies
12
Judge Estrada-Mullaney
San Luis Obispo Superior Court
1055 Monterey St.,
San Luis Obispo, CA 93408
Courtesy Copy
Judge Martin Tangeman
San Luis Obispo Superior Court
1055 Monterey St.,
San Luis Obispo, CA 93408
Courtesy Copy
Filed 6/28/10 Modified and certified for publication 7/28/10 (order attached)
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
|
DIVISION SIX WILLIAM BOOKOUT, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. STATE OF CALIFORNIA ex rel. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION et al., Defendants and Respondents. |
2d Civil No. B214906 (Super. Ct. No. CV 060384) (San Luis Obispo County) |
Plaintiff brought this action against a number of public entities and a railroad claiming the defendants caused his property to flood when it rained. The complaint alleged inverse condemnation and tort causes of action. The inverse condemnation cause of action was tried to the court. After plaintiff's case, the trial court granted nonsuit based on the statute of limitations, failure to prove causation, and a determination that the railroad is not a public entity. Thereafter, the defendants moved for judgment on the pleadings on the tort causes of action. The court granted the motion based on the trial court's previous finding of lack of causation and the statute of limitations. We affirm. 2
FACTS In 2000, William Bookout acquired a parcel of property in the Oceano community of San Luis Obispo County (County). He began operating a nursery business on the property shortly thereafter. The property lies at the intersection of Paso Robles and 13th Streets. Highway 1 cuts diagonally across the intersection, cutting through the southwest tip of Bookout's parcel. The California Department of Transportation (Caltrans) owns Highway 1. The Union Pacific Railroad (Railroad) owns land across from Highway 1. The Railroad's predecessor in interest, the Southern Pacific Railroad Company, acquired the land by deed from a private party in 1894. A railroad line on a raised bed was constructed on the property. When it rains, surface water from the surrounding area drains away from Bookout's parcel and into a drainage channel on the Railroad's property. A 24-inch iron pipe conducts the water under the raised rail bed. In 1939 or 1940, the Railroad extended the pipe to go under a second spur added by the Railroad. The Pismo Oceano Vegetable Exchange (Exchange) first leased, then purchased, from the Railroad the property west of the raised rail bed. The iron pipe discharges onto the Exchange's parcel. Around 1977, the Exchange installed a subsurface junction box at the pipe's outfall. From the junction box, the water is diverted 90 degrees through a second 24-inch pipe to a retaining pond 200 feet away. The junction box is inadequate, causing the water to back up and flood Bookout's property. The Oceano Community Services District (District) owns a water well. From time to time, the well discharges water into the drainage channel that leads to the culvert under the rail bed. Exchange employee, Dan Sutton, testified Bookout discussed the flooding with him shortly after the nursery opened. District employee, Phillip Davis, testified Bookout complained about flooding every time it rained. Davis recalled receiving a complaint from Bookout about flooding in December 2002. Davis's daily log for that year makes reference to a meeting with 3 Bookout on December 20, 2002. Bookout took a picture of the pipe going into the drainage channel in the aftermath of a rain event in 2002. The picture included a District employee. Caltrans employee, Fred Brebes, testified that before he retired in 2002 he met with Bookout about damage to his property due to flooding. In June 2002, Bookout returned a County questionnaire concerning flooding in Oceano. Bookout stated on the questionnaire that flooding, one foot deep, occurred once a year, and that the flooding damages his inventory. On May 2, 2006, Bookout filed a complaint against Caltrans, the District, the Railroad, the County and the Exchange for inverse condemnation, nuisance, trespass and negligence. Bookout filed a first amended complaint in May 2007. He alleged the flooding ruined his nursery business. Trial on the inverse condemnation cause of action was bifurcated from the other causes of action. Trial was before the court sitting without a jury. During trial, the Exchange entered into a good faith settlement with Bookout. Trial proceeded against the remaining defendants. Bookout claimed he first discovered the flooding in February 2004. His expert engineer, Keith Crowe, testified that six conditions caused the flooding: (1) the pipe under the Railroad's tracks was too small for the conditions; (2) the pipe's capacity was compromised by the Exchange's poorly designed extension; (3) the District's well added silt and debris; (4) the County, Caltrans and the District allowed or caused upstream watershed conditions to worsen; (5) all remaining defendants contributed to a decrease in storage volume at the pipe's inlet; and (6) a lack of maintenance by all defendants. After Bookout completed the presentation of his case, the defendants moved for judgment of nonsuit pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 631.8.1 The trial court granted the motion.
1 All statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure unless stated otherwise. 4
The trial court determined that the applicable statute of limitations is three years, pursuant to section 338, subdivision (j). The court found Bookout's cause of action for inverse condemnation accrued some time prior to the middle of 2002. Thus the cause of action is barred by the statute of limitations. The court also found Bookout failed to carry his burden of proof that acts or omissions by the District, the County or Caltrans were the cause of the flooding. The court found that the Railroad may have been negligent by failing to enlarge the culvert or requiring that its tenant do so. But the court also found that the Railroad is not a public entity subject to an action for inverse condemnation. After the trial court granted nonsuit on the inverse condemnation cause of action, the defendants moved for judgment on the pleadings for the remaining causes of action. The motion was based on collateral estoppel. A different trial court granted the motion. The trial court relied on the finding in the first phase that Bookout failed to prove causation as to the County, the District and Caltrans. Although the court in the first phase stated the Railroad may have been negligent, the court in the second phase determined that all remaining causes of action against the Railroad were barred by limitations. DISCUSSION I
First Phase: Inverse Condemnation
(a)
Bookout contends the trial court applied the wrong statute of limitations.
The trial court applied section 338, subdivision (j), which provides a three-year limitation on "[a]n action to recover for physical damage to private property under Section 19 of Article I of the California Constitution." Section 19 of article I requires just compensation where private property is "taken or damaged" by a public entity. (Cal. Const., art. I, § 19, subd. (a).) 5
Bookout argues the trial court should have applied the five-year statute of limitations applicable to actions for adverse possession. (See §§ 318, 319.)
If the property is damaged, the three-year statute of limitation applies; if the property is taken, the five-year limitation on actions to recover property applies. (3 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (5th ed. 2008) § 605, p. 786; Patrick Media Group, Inc. v. California Coastal Com. (1992) 9 Cal.App.4th 592, 607.)
Thus, in Lyles v. State of California (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 281, 285, the court applied the three-year statute to allegations that plaintiff's property was damaged by a flood caused when a state-owned culvert became blocked. In Lee v. Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 848, 855 (Lee), the court and parties agreed that the three-year statute applied to allegations that plaintiff's property was damaged by the construction of a subway under a neighboring street.
In contrast, courts have applied the five-year statute where a public entity has physically entered and exercised dominion and control over some portion of plaintiff's property. Thus, in Frustuck v. City of Fairfax (1963) 212 Cal.App.2d 345, the city entered plaintiff's property, widened a drainage ditch that ran the length of the property and constructed a berm. In Ocean Shore R.R. Co. v. City of Santa Cruz (1961) 198 Cal.App.2d 267, 272, the city constructed a road over plaintiff's property. In Garden Water Corp. v. Fambrough (1966) 245 Cal.App.2d 324, 328, a public entity took possession of plaintiff's water system, supplied water to some 90 residences, maintained the system and retained all income.
Here, unlike cases applying the five-year statute, no public entity physically entered Bookout's land or maintained possession and control over any portion of it. The trial court correctly concluded the three-year statute applies. Bookout argues that even if the three-year statute applies, the trial court failed to use the "date of stabilization" to determine when the cause of action accrued. 6 In Pierpont Inn, Inc. v. State of California (1969) 70 Cal.2d 282 (disapproved on other ground in Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority v. Continental Development Corp. (1997) 16 Cal.4th 694), the state constructed a freeway over land owned by Pierpont. Pierpont brought an action for condemnation and damages. The state demurred on the ground that Pierpont failed to file a claim under the government claims within two years of the accrual of the cause of action. The court held the claim was timely. Pierpont reasonably awaited the completion of the project to determine more accurately the exact extent to which its remaining property would be damaged. (Id. at p. 293.) Courts have subsequently cited Pierpont for the proposition that where there is continuous and repeated damage, incident to a public improvement, the limitations period does not begin to run until the situation has stabilized. (See Lee, supra, 107 Cal.App.4th at p. 857.)
The determination of when the statute of limitations begins to run is a question of fact. (Lee, supra, 107 Cal.App.4th at p. 857.) Here the trial court determined that the date of stabilization theory does not apply. The court found that the last improvements to the drainage system were constructed by the Exchange in the late 1970's, and that the flooding problem was relatively consistent and static for several years prior to the time Bookout purchased his property in 2000.
Bookout challenges the trial court's findings by listing what it characterizes as changed conditions since the Exchange constructed the junction box in the 1970's. The alleged changed conditions include: maintenance activities, modifications to Well No. 8, weed abatement, removal of a retaining wall, alteration of Highway 1, shoveling and grading of debris, accumulation of debris, and an increase in impervious surfaces. But none of these alleged change of conditions compelled the trial court to conclude that the flowing was not relatively consistent and static for several years prior to Bookout's purchase of his property. Bookout argues the trial court erred in receiving documentary evidence that was not produced during discovery. The document is a county 7 drainage study questionnaire returned by Bookout in July 2002. Bookout stated on the questionnaire that the area floods one foot or more once a year and that the flooding has damaged his inventory. The County explained that it was unaware of the document at the time of discovery. It said that the questionnaire responses were summarized for inclusion in a drainage study, but they were not filed by name, address or location. The Railroad's counsel happened to find Bookout's response during Crowe's testimony. The County pointed out that Bookout must have been aware of the document because he submitted it to the County. The trial court found the failure to produce the document was not in bad faith, and refused to impose discovery sanctions. Bookout cites Pate v. Channel Lumber Co. (1977) 51 Cal.App.4th 1447, 1455, for the proposition that the trial court has the power to exclude documents that a party has failed to produce in response to discovery requests. But in Pate, the trial court found that the party who failed to produce the requested documents had "'played fast'" with the discovery rules. (Id. at p. 1453.) The trial court found no such bad faith here. Discovery sanctions are reviewed for an abuse of discretion. (Id. at p. 1454.) The trial court did not abuse its discretion.
In any event, even without the challenged document, the trial court's finding that Bookout knew about the flooding in 2002 is supported by overwhelming evidence. Sutton, Davis and Brebes testified Bookout complained to them about flooding in 2002. Bookout even admitted he took a picture of the drainage pipe in the aftermath of flooding in 2002. Bookout has failed to carry his burden of showing he would have obtained a more favorable result had the challenged document been excluded. (See Thomas v. Lusk (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 1709, 1720.)
(b) Even if the trial court erred in applying the statute of limitations, the trial court found that Bookout failed to carry his burden of proof as to causation in 8 his action against the District, the County and Caltrans. Plaintiff has the burden of proving a substantial causal relationship between the defendant's act or omission and the injury. (California State Automobile Assn. v. City of Palo Alto (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 474, 481.) To carry that burden plaintiff must exclude the probability that other forces alone produced the injury. (Ibid.)
Where, as here, the judgment is against the party who has the burden of proof, it is almost impossible for him to prevail on appeal by arguing the evidence compels a judgment in his favor. That is because unless the trial court makes specific findings of fact in favor of the losing plaintiff, we presume the trial court found plaintiff's evidence lacks sufficient weight and credibility to carry the burden of proof. (See Rodney F. v. Karen M. (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 233, 241; Kunzler v. Karde (1980) 109 Cal.App.3d 683, 688 [judgment appealed from is presumed correct].) We have no power on appeal to judge the credibility of witnesses or to reweigh the evidence. (Kimble v. Board of Education (1987) 192 Cal.App.3d 1423, 1427.)
Bookout points to no findings of fact in his favor. Instead, he relies on over 500 photographs and videos showing the flooding, several hundred documents which he claims show each defendant exercised dominion and control over the drainage facilities, and the testimony of his expert engineer, Keith Crow. He believes the evidence against the defendants was overwhelming. Bookout claims the evidence is credible because it is uncontradicted. He cites Joseph v. Drew (1950) 36 Cal.2d 575, 579, for the proposition that uncontradicted testimony of a witness may not be disregarded, but should be accepted as proof of the fact to which the witness testified. Indeed, there are no doubt cases where the uncontradicted testimony of a witness is so credible that no reasonable trier of fact could reject it. But this is not such a case.
Here there is an obvious cause of the flooding. The Exchange modified the drainage by constructing a junction box and pipeline that redirected the flow of water by 90 degrees. The Exchange has settled with Bookout. 9 Evidence that the remaining defendants contributed to the conditions that caused the flooding rests largely in Crowe's expert testimony. As helpful as expert opinion can be, such testimony carries a built-in bias: experts are most often very well paid for their opinions. The trial court had good reason to be skeptical of Crowe's testimony. We apply the usual rule on appeal that the trier of fact is not required to believe the testimony of any witness, even if uncontradicted. (Sprague v. Equifax, Inc. (1985) 166 Cal.App.3d 1012, 1028.) The evidence presented here did not compel the trial court to find in favor of Bookout.
Bookout argues the County may be liable even if it did not cause the flooding. He cites Marin v. City of San Rafael (1980) 111 Cal.App.3d 591, for the proposition that a governmental entity may be liable if it approves a work of improvement. There the city constructed a drainage pipe that extended onto a lot owned by plaintiffs' predecessor. The lot owner obtained a permit to extend the pipe beyond his lot. The city's engineer told him exactly what pipe to lay and how to do it. Later a home was constructed on the buried drainage pipe. Plaintiffs purchased the home without knowledge of the pipe's existence. A few months later the pipe burst during a heavy rain damaging plaintiffs' property. Plaintiffs placed a concrete obstruction in the pipe to prevent further damage. The city obtained an injunction requiring plaintiffs to remove the obstruction and restore the pipe to an operational condition. The trial court found the city was not liable.
The Court of Appeal reversed. The court stated the city was liable because (1) its engineer supervised and directed installation of the pipe, (2) the city used the pipe for drainage over many years, and (3) the city conceded the pipe was part of its storm drainage system. (Marin v. City of San Rafael, supra, 111 Cal.App.3d at p. 596.) In other words, the city was liable because it directed the installation of, used, and owned the pipe. It even obtained an injunction to prevent plaintiffs from interfering with its operation. None of those factors are present here. 10
(c) Bookout contends the trial court improperly applied a reasonableness test to determine liability. He points out that except for damage caused by public flood control projects, the test in inverse condemnation actions is strict liability. (Citing Arreola v. County of Monterey (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 722, 753-754.)
But Bookout fails to point to anywhere in the record that the trial court applied the reasonableness test instead of strict liability. In any event, the court's ruling was based on the statute of limitations and failure to prove causation. The results are the same under the reasonableness test or strict liability. The defendants prevail. II
Second Phase: Judgment on the Pleadings
(a)
A judgment on the pleadings is similar to a general demurrer. (See 6 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (5th ed. 2008) Proceedings Without Trial, § 187, p. 625.) The factual allegations of the complaint are accepted as true. (Ibid.) The court, however, may grant judgment on the basis of extrinsic matters of which it may take judicial notice. (Ibid.) Bookout does not contest that the trial court may take judicial notice of the court's decision in the first phase of the trial.
The trial court in the first phase found Bookout failed to prove the County, the District or Caltrans caused harm to Bookout. Bookout argues the standard of causation for inverse condemnation is different from tort causation. He cites CACI No. 431 on multiple causes.2 He claims, without citation to authority, that the standard of proof for causation stated in CACI No. 431 differs from causation for inverse condemnation. He fails to specify how it differs. In fact, if the
2 CACI No. 431 states: "A person's negligence may combine with another factor to cause harm. If you find that [defendant's] negligence was a substantial factor in causing [plaintiff's] harm, then [defendant] is responsible for the harm. [Defendant] cannot avoid responsibility just because some other person, condition, or event was also a substantial factor in causing [plaintiff's] harm." 11
defendant did not cause harm, there is no causation no matter what the cause of action. The trial court properly granted judgment on the pleadings to the County, the District and Caltrans. (b) The trial court in the second phase did not grant the Railroad judgment on the pleadings based on failure to prove causation. That is because the trial court in the first phase stated, "[A]t most, the Railroad negligently acted by omission by failing to enlarge a culvert or by failing to require (if that was possible) that its tenant do so." Instead, the trial court in the second phase granted the Railroad judgment on the pleadings based on the statute of limitations. Bookout argues the trial court in the second phase erred in basing its judgment on the three-year statute of limitations. (§ 338, subd. (b).) Instead, Bookout contends the flooding constitutes a continuous trespass or nuisance and a new cause of action arises each time it floods. The cases distinguish between permanent and continuous nuisance or trespass. Where a nuisance is of such a character that it will presumably continue indefinitely, it is considered permanent and the limitations period runs from the time the nuisance is created. (Phillips v. City of Pasadena (1945) 27 Cal.2d 104, 107.) Where, however, a nuisance may be discontinued at any time, it is considered continuing in character. (Ibid.) A person injured by a continuous nuisance may bring successive actions, even though an action based on the original wrong may be barred. (Id. at pp. 107-108.) The same rules apply whether the wrong is characterized as nuisance or trespass. (Mangini v. Aerojet-General Corp. (1991) 230 Cal.App.3d 1125, 1148.)
In Phillips, the alleged nuisance was a locked gate. The court determined that the nuisance could be characterized as continuous because it could be removed at any time. (Phillips v. City of Pasadena, supra, 27 Cal.2d at p. 108.) Here the Railroad purchased its property in 1894. The raised rail bed and culvert pipe have been in place at least since 1940 and most probably for over 100 years. 12
Unlike a locked gate, there is nothing to suggest the pipe is temporary or might be modified at any time. Our Supreme Court has stated, "The cases finding the nuisance complained of to be unquestionably permanent in nature have involved solid structures, such as a building encroaching upon the plaintiff's land . . . ." (Baker v. Burbank-Glendale-Pasadena Airport Authority (1985) 39 Cal.3d 862, 869.) The solid structure here is no less permanent because it is built on a defendant's land.
Bookout cites Mangini for the proposition that a nuisance is continuous if the damage is continuous. Bookout's reliance on Mangini is misplaced. There plaintiffs alleged the defendant created a nuisance by polluting their land with hazardous waste. Defendant demurred on the ground that the complaint was filed beyond the three-year limitation. The trial court sustained the demurrer. In reversing, the Court of Appeal recognized the test for continuous nuisance is that the nuisance may be discontinued at any time. (Mangini v. Aerojet-General Corp., supra, 230 Cal.App.3d at p. 1143.) The court stated that the allegations of the complaint meet "the crucial test of a continuing nuisance: that the offensive condition is abatable." (Id. at p. 1147.) Because the defendant's alleged conduct ended years prior to the filing of the complaint, the court went on to say, "We note plaintiffs' land may be subject to a continuing nuisance even though defendant's offensive conduct ended years ago. That is because the 'continuing' nature of the nuisance refers to the continuing damage caused by the offensive condition, not to the acts causing the offensive condition to occur." (Ibid.)
Unlike the instant case, Mangini did not involve a solid structure. It involved abatable pollution. The court did not mean to suggest a nuisance is continuous simply because the damage produced by the nuisance is continuous. A solid structure that encroaches on a plaintiff's land produces continuous damage. Yet, our Supreme Court described such a nuisance as "unquestionably permanent." (Baker v. Burbank-Glendale-Pasadena Airport Authority, supra, 39 Cal.3d at 13
p. 869.) All Mangini was trying to say is that a nuisance can still be continuous even after the offensive conduct has ended.
The nuisance or trespass alleged here is permanent. The three-year statute of limitations bars Bookout's causes of action for nuisance and trespass. The judgment is affirmed. Costs are awarded to respondents. GILBERT, P.J. We concur: YEGAN, J. PERREN, J. Martin J. Tangeman, Teresa Estrada-Mullaney, Judges Superior Court County of San Luis Obispo ______________________________ Belsher & Becker; Belsher, Becker & Roberts, John W. Belsher, Gregory A. Connell for Plaintiff and Appellant. Ronald W. Beals, Chief Counsel, David Gossage, Deputy Chief Counsel, Lucille Baca, Assistant Chief Counsel, Wm. David Sullivan, Derek S. Van Hoften for Defendant and Respondent State of California Department of Transportation. Porter Scott, Terence J. Cassidy, Thomas L. Riordan, Michael William Pott for Defendant and Respondent County of San Luis Obispo. Daner Law Firm, Adam M. Daner for Defendant and Respondent Oceano Community Services District. Randolph Cregger & Chalfant LLP, Thomas A. Cregger for Defendant and Respondent Union Pacific Railroad.
Filed 7/28/10 Publication & Modification order
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
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DIVISION SIX WILLIAM BOOKOUT, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. STATE OF CALIFORNIA ex rel. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION et al., Defendants and Respondents. |
2d Civil No. B214906 (Super. Ct. No. CV 060384) (San Luis Obispo County) ORDER MODIFYING OPINION AND CERTIFYING OPINION FOR PUBLICATION [NO CHANGE IN JUDGMENT] |